The Thesis of the Omnisubjectivity of God in Linda Zagzebski’s Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

The article is devoted to an original understanding of the attribute of omniscience, which is presented in the works of the contemporary philosopher of religion and epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. The study is based primarily on a critical reading of the monograph ‘‘Omnisubjectivity: Essays on God and Subjectivity’’, as well as Zagzebski’s articles and lecture materials. In particular, the author examines the conceptual reasons that lead Zagzebski to introduce the notion of ‘omnisubjectivity’, which is intended to denote God’s ability to have a ‘first-person’ experience of any conscious sentient being. Two main arguments in favour of postulating this attribute are considered: an argument from philosophy of consciousness, derived from F. Jackson’s thought experiment, and an argument from indexical semantics, based on the ideas of J. Parry. Four models of omnisubjectivity proposed by Zagzebski are then evaluated: the empathy model, the perceptual model, panentheism, and the metaphor of light. The author then discusses the theological implications of postulating the attribute of omnibjectivity. In this connection, the meaning of prayer, divine providence and love, as well as religious morality and divine judgement, are discussed separately. Having described Zagzebski’s concept, the author develops a number of critical arguments by means of which he justifies the non-binding character of the attribute of omnisubjectivity. The first counterargument is based on ideas about religious ontology. The second counterargument is based on W. Mander’s notion that perhaps subjective experience is not a form of knowledge from a divine perspective. Finally, the third critical argument is based on the idea that there are conceivable cognitive states that it would be contradictory to attribute to God.